NEW DELHI, November 11, 2026 — The Supreme Court has asked WhatsApp and other digital intermediaries to set out the steps they propose to take against digital arrest scams and related cybercrime, directing them to send their plans to the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre as well as the court. The direction appears in an order from an October 29 hearing that was uploaded to the court’s website on Tuesday. The matter is listed for November 23.
The bench, led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and comprising Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana, has also sought information from the Reserve Bank of India and reports from law-enforcement agencies in every state and Union territory. The directions place three parts of the response under scrutiny at the same time: the platforms through which fraudsters contact victims, the banks through which money is moved, and the police agencies expected to investigate and prevent the offences.
The case, titled “In Re: Victims of Digital Arrest Related to Forged Documents”, was taken up by the court on its own motion. The October 29 order directs WhatsApp and other concerned intermediaries to inform the bench about the measures they propose to undertake to prevent digital arrest scams and connected cyber offences. They must also submit those proposals to the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre, or I4C, which coordinates cybercrime response across agencies.
The direction does not amount to a finding that WhatsApp or another platform caused the scams. It requires the companies to explain what safeguards they can put in place and gives the court a basis for examining whether those steps are adequate. The distinction matters because a platform may be used by criminals to contact a victim without being responsible for the fraud itself; the court is now asking what preventive systems the intermediaries can reasonably deploy and how their proposals can be assessed.
Senior advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for WhatsApp, told the bench that the platform had taken action against 9,400 accounts linked to such activity and would file an affidavit describing its measures. He also said the company was working on software intended to identify suspicious accounts and warn users. Those were submissions made on behalf of the platform, not findings by the court that the proposed software has already been deployed or that it can detect every scam.
The court has separately directed law-enforcement agencies in all states and Union territories to provide information about first information reports registered in digital arrest cases and the investigations arising from them. The agencies have also been asked to suggest measures for prevention, detection and prosecution. Directors general of police have been told to ensure compliance, while the reports are to be sent to the inter-departmental committee coordinating the government’s response. Reports submitted to the court are also to be forwarded to that committee.
The request for police data is important because the scale and pattern of digital arrest fraud can be difficult to assess from individual complaints alone. Investigators need to know how many cases have been registered, how they are being investigated, where money has moved and which methods are recurring. A national picture could help identify networks and gaps in enforcement, although the value of the exercise will depend on whether the reports use consistent definitions and provide information that can be compared across jurisdictions.
The court’s October 29 order also reiterates that the RBI’s proposed regulatory measures should include provisions requiring financial institutions to compensate victims when an investigation establishes that a fraud occurred because the institution failed to exercise due diligence in preventing or reporting it. The compensation contemplated by the bench should be no less than the amount lost by the customer in such a case. This is a direction about what the proposed regulatory framework should contain; it is not a blanket order requiring every bank to reimburse every person who reports an online scam.
The bench has asked the RBI to submit a list of all authorised financial institutions before the next hearing. That list would help identify the entities to which the eventual regulatory requirements may apply and support a more uniform approach. The court has also said it wants to examine the proposed RBI Know Your Customer Amendment Directions, 2026, before the regulatory process is finalised. The directions have been proposed for notification by November 30 and operationalisation by December 31, dates that remain subject to the regulatory process.
The safeguards discussed in the proceedings go beyond compensation after a loss. The court has referred to temporarily suspending transactions that are unusual or inconsistent with a customer’s past account activity, automatically alerting the nearest police station when suspicious activity is detected, and physically verifying a transaction where necessary. The aim is to interrupt a transfer while there is still time to establish whether the customer is acting freely or under coercion.
That approach raises practical questions for banks. A sudden large transfer may be legitimate, while a series of smaller payments may be part of a scam. A system that stops too few suspicious transactions may fail to protect customers; one that blocks too many can prevent people from accessing their own money. Banks will need clear thresholds, rapid review procedures, reliable contact with customers and a way to record why a transfer was delayed or allowed. The court’s suggestions identify the problem, but the detailed standards will have to be worked out through the RBI’s regulatory process.
The bench observed that cybercrime had declined by 50 per cent while victims had still lost about ₹800 crore so far this year. That figure was cited as part of the court’s assessment of the continuing scale of the problem. It underlines why a fall in reported offences does not necessarily mean that the financial harm has become small: a smaller number of high-value transfers can still produce substantial losses.
Digital arrest is a label used for a form of impersonation and coercion, not a legal process through which someone can be arrested over a video call. Fraudsters pose as police officers, investigators, court officials or other authorities, then tell a target that a parcel, bank account, identity document or phone number has been linked to a crime. They may display forged documents, use video calls to create the appearance of an official interrogation and threaten immediate arrest unless the person follows instructions.
The pressure is designed to isolate the victim from family members and independent advice. A caller may insist that the person remain on camera, avoid speaking to anyone else or transfer money to an account described as a verification or security arrangement. The money is then moved through accounts controlled by the fraud network or its intermediaries. The use of messaging platforms, phone numbers, forged documents and bank transfers means that no single institution sees the entire sequence.
That is why the court’s directions involve several agencies. Intermediaries may have information about suspicious accounts and contact patterns; banks can see unusual transactions and account histories; and police can connect complaints, identify beneficiaries and investigate the people arranging the transfers. Effective prevention requires these systems to exchange information within the law while protecting the personal data of ordinary users and avoiding arbitrary restrictions.
The proposed compensation requirement is also conditional. A customer’s report that a scam occurred does not automatically establish that the bank failed its duties. The investigation would have to establish a connection between the institution’s lack of due diligence and the fraud. That standard is intended to make financial institutions accountable for failures in their own controls, while leaving the facts of individual cases to be examined rather than assuming that every loss has the same cause.
For consumers, the immediate protection remains to end calls in which someone claims to place them under digital arrest, refuse to transfer money to “verification” accounts and independently contact the relevant bank or police agency through a number obtained from an official source. Anyone who has transferred money should alert the bank immediately and report the incident through the national cybercrime reporting system. A caller’s claim to be a judge, police officer or regulator does not make the demand for payment lawful.
The next hearing on November 23 will give the court an opportunity to examine the responses from intermediaries, the RBI and law-enforcement agencies. The central questions are whether platforms can identify and disrupt suspicious activity, whether banks can intervene before unusual transfers become irreversible, and whether police agencies can produce a coordinated account of the cases they are handling. The regulatory timetable will also matter: the court wants to examine the RBI’s proposed KYC directions before they are notified and put into operation.
The order therefore marks a broader examination of how digital fraud is prevented, rather than a single instruction to one company. Its eventual impact will depend on the quality of the proposals, the precision of the RBI’s rules and the ability of investigators to act on the information they receive. Until those steps are completed, the court’s observations should not be mistaken for a fully implemented compensation scheme or a guarantee that every suspicious transfer will be stopped.
Also read: Supreme Court Seeks Bank Compensation Rules for Digital Arrest Fraud Victims
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